# GHSA-9CX8-QJP8-HCMR: Found while validating the fix for issue #10597 at main e353330c5c

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-04
- Modified: 2026-11-04

## Affected versions

- com.arcadedb:arcadedb-redisw (Maven): through 26.10.2

## Description

Found while validating the fix for issue #10597 at main e353330c5c. Reported privately per SECURITY.md.

Context first, because it matters for how you read this: #10597 itself was filed by us as a PUBLIC issue, which was our mistake. The log-amplification half it reported is genuinely fixed. What follows is a residual we are NOT adding to that public thread, and the public note on #10846 frames it only as a log-level change.


**#10597 residual, deepened.** The log-amplification half is genuinely fixed: 40 KB of junk now produces
one `-ERR Protocol error` and a close, and the record count no longer scales with the input. What
survives is a pre-authentication connection hold, measured on a real socket against the test server:

    *1\r\n:1\r\n                        8 bytes   -> no reply at all, connection STILL OPEN after 4s
    *1\r\n:1\r\n repeated 2000 times    16000 bytes -> no reply at all, connection STILL OPEN after 4s
    *1\r\n*0\r\n                        8 bytes   -> no reply at all, connection STILL OPEN after 4s

The code path is `executeCommand`'s first arm: an array whose first element is not a `String` is logged
at FINE and the method returns without a reply and without setting `shutdown`, so the read loop goes
straight back to `parseNext`. The maintainer names the `:1` shape in the "still open" note of #10846 and
tracks it as #10845, describing it as a log-level change. Three things make it worth more than that
framing, and none of them are in the public issue:

1. **It is reachable with no credentials.** `parseNext` and this arm both run before `executeCommand`
   reaches the AUTH check, exactly as the original report established for the two arms that were fixed.
2. **It defeats the idle timeout.** `arcadedb.network.socketTimeout` (30 s) closes an *idle* pre-auth
   connection. Eight bytes every 29 s keeps a connection non-idle forever at a cost of roughly 0.3 bytes
   per second per connection, with the server holding one `RedisNetworkExecutor` **thread** per
   connection. The connection-count and thread-count ceiling is therefore reachable by an unauthenticated
   client at negligible bandwidth. The arms that were fixed all now close, so this is the only pre-auth
   shape left that holds a thread.
3. **The regression test cannot see it.** `Issue10597RedisMalformedInputTest.countingLogger` counts only
   records of level `>= Level.INFO`, and the same commit moved this arm's record from SEVERE to FINE. So
   `logRecordCountDoesNotDependOnTheNumberOfJunkBytes` is structurally blind to this path, and a future
   change that re-floods it at FINE would not be caught either.

Suggested remedy, same shape as the rest of the fix: that arm raises `RedisProtocolLimitException`, so
`run()`'s single handler owns the one reply and the close, and the test's counter counts every level
rather than `>= INFO`. Nothing else in the parser then has a no-reply-no-close exit.

No other security-relevant finding in this set. For completeness, the one adjacent item I checked and am
*not* reporting as a weakness: #10601's `reportClusterTokenRefusal` is reachable pre-authentication, but
its 60 s gate is deliberately placed in front of both the log write and the password-file read, and the
code comment explains why the gate is per node rather than per caller (a per-caller map would be state an
unauthenticated caller could grow). That reasoning is correct.


## Related advisories

This advisory and its CVE also cover the following advisories, fixed in the same release (26.11.1):

- [GHSA-hphw-285h-wx93](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-hphw-285h-wx93): The unauthenticated Redis log amplification already public as issue 10597 also destroys the server log history, because the shipped handler is a bounded rotating one

## References

- https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-9cx8-qjp8-hcmr

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-9CX8-QJP8-HCMR
