- Database
- GitHub
- Severity
- Medium
- Published
- Modified
Description
SVG files uploaded through the Curator media panel are stored and served inline without any sanitization. An authenticated user with permission to upload media can upload an SVG containing embedded JavaScript. When another panel user opens that file via the View action (which opens the media as a top-level browser document), the embedded script executes in the origin of the Filament application.
image/svg+xml is included in the default accepted MIME types, so a default installation is affected unless SVG uploads have been explicitly disabled.
Impact
Because the SVG is served as a top-level document (not embedded in an <img> tag), any <script>, event-handler attribute (e.g. onload), or javascript: URI inside it runs with full script privileges in the application's origin. In a Filament admin context this can be leveraged to:
- perform actions as the viewing user (typically a privileged administrator) via authenticated same-origin requests,
- read same-origin data the victim's session can access,
- exfiltrate cookies/tokens not protected from script access.
The primary escalation path is a lower-privileged content author planting a payload that is later triggered when a higher-privileged user clicks View on the file. Panel thumbnails are not affected — they render through an <img> tag, which does not execute SVG script.
Proof of concept
- As a user who can upload media, upload an SVG file containing:
```xml <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(document.domain)"> <rect width="100" height="100" fill="#fff"/> </svg>
- In the Curator panel, click the View (eye) action for the uploaded file. The file opens as a standalone document and the script executes in the application origin.
Patches
The fix sanitizes SVG markup at the upload choke point (Uploader), stripping scripts, event handlers, and remote references before the file is written to storage. Sanitizing at the source closes every serving path (the direct storage URL and the on-the-fly Glide/MediaController fallback) without changing the default accepted MIME types. Sanitization fails closed: if the markup cannot be parsed it is not stored.
A console command is included to re-sanitize SVG files already stored on disk from earlier uploads:
php artisan curator:sanitize-svgs # sanitize in place php artisan curator:sanitize-svgs --dry-run # preview only
After upgrading to a patched release, run curator:sanitize-svgs to clean any SVGs uploaded before the patch.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, either of the following mitigates the issue:
- Disallow SVG uploads — remove image/svg+xml from the accepted file types (e.g. via acceptedFileTypes(...) on the Curator field/plugin), or
- Serve untrusted SVGs safely — configure your web server / storage responses to send stored SVGs with Content-Disposition: attachment (or a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script) so they cannot execute as a top-level document.
Credit
Reported via coordinated disclosure by Afsana Alijabarova.
Affected versions
- awcodes/filament-curatorPackagist
From 5.0.0 · fixed in 5.1.2
- awcodes/filament-curatorPackagist
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.1.2
- awcodes/filament-curatorPackagist
From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.7.9