# GHSA-8CGQ-X343-P74C: mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts write\_attachments() and silently drops the rest of the batch

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-16
- Modified: 2026-11-16

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-129301](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-129301.md): mail-parser uncaught exception in write\_attachments() drops attachments

## Affected versions

- mail-parser (PyPI): from 4.6.0, fixed in 4.6.3

## Description

### Impact

`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only `MailParserError`.

That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part
first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that
a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client
intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same
failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in
[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).

Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:

- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the
  filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;
- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised
  `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a
  `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.

```python
import tempfile, mailparser

raw = ("Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\r\n\r\nxx\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\r\n\r\nyy\r\n"
       "--b--\r\n")

mp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)     # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None
mp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())
# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written
# 4.6.3         -> logs "Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\x00.bin'";
#                  good.bin is written
```

`parse()` itself was never affected — it catches the `ValueError` — so only the write path was
unguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename
sanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).

### Patches

Fixed in **4.6.3**. `write_attachments()` now logs and skips a single unusable attachment
instead of aborting the batch:

- an invalid filename is caught and skipped;
- overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than
  reaching `open()`;
- the base64 decode moved *before* `open()`, so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now
  repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching `MIME::Base64` on 2008
  cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from
  the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;
- `MailParserPathError` is deliberately **not** caught by the per-attachment handler: a
  containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise
  `MailParserPathError` instead of `ValueError` so the broader catch cannot swallow them.

Deduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker
(`write_sample()` sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off,
collapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem
instead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now
milliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse `Invoice.pdf` and
`invoice.pdf`.

### Workarounds

Upgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call `write_attachments()` on untrusted mail;
iterate `parser.attachments` yourself and write each attachment inside its own
`try`/`except Exception`, skipping the ones whose `safe_filename` is `None`.

## References

- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129301
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/171
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/11b894a0b8b3f11055a99caff118206138d1daba
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/e1d9fe6778045d6e2c44406bc8822e3464c1097f
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.3

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-8CGQ-X343-P74C
