- Database
- GitHub
- Severity
- medium
- Published
- Modified
Description
Impact
write_attachments() called _safe_attachment_filename() and write_sample() inside its loop with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment after the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that catches only MailParserError.
That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496.
Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:
- NUL smuggled through RFC 2231 —
filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bindecodes to a NUL in the filename during parsing and raisedValueErrorout of the name check; - overlong basename — a filename longer than
NAME_MAX(e.g. 300 characters) raisedOSError: File name too longfromopen(), after creating a zero-byte stub on disk; - undecodable payload — a body that is not valid base64 raised
binascii.Error(aValueErrorsubclass) from the decode performed inside theopen()block.
import tempfile, mailparser
raw = ("Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
"--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\r\n\r\nxx\r\n"
"--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\r\n\r\nyy\r\n"
"--b--\r\n")
mp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw) # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None
mp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())
# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written
# 4.6.3 -> logs "Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\x00.bin'";
# good.bin is writtenparse() itself was never affected — it catches the ValueError — so only the write path was unguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename sanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).
Patches
Fixed in 4.6.3. write_attachments() now logs and skips a single unusable attachment instead of aborting the batch:
- an invalid filename is caught and skipped;
- overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than reaching
open(); - the base64 decode moved before
open(), so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matchingMIME::Base64on 2008 cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient; MailParserPathErroris deliberately not caught by the per-attachment handler: a containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raiseMailParserPathErrorinstead ofValueErrorso the broader catch cannot swallow them.
Deduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker (write_sample() sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off, collapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem instead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now milliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse Invoice.pdf and invoice.pdf.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call write_attachments() on untrusted mail; iterate parser.attachments yourself and write each attachment inside its own try/except Exception, skipping the ones whose safe_filename is None.
Affected versions
- mail-parserPyPI
From 4.6.0 · fixed in 4.6.3