Unauthenticated Stored XSS in the Contact module via HTML sanitizer bypass
Description
An unauthenticated stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the Contact module of NukeViet CMS. An anonymous visitor can submit crafted HTML through the message content (fcon) field. The payload survives the server-side HTML sanitizer and is later rendered in the administration panel when an administrator (or the staff member responsible for Contact) opens the message, causing arbitrary JavaScript to execute in the admin origin.
Description
The root cause is in the HTML sanitizer unhtmlentities() / filterAttr() inside vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php.
The sanitizer decodes numeric HTML entities before checking attribute values for dangerous URL schemes such as javascript:. The decoding regular expression only tolerated a fixed number of leading zeros:
$search = '/&#[xX]0{0,8}(...|6a|...);?/i';Because 0{0,8} matches at most 8 leading zeros, an entity with 9 or more leading zeros is not decoded:
j -> the character 'j' (0x6A) is NOT decoded by the filterThe subsequent scheme checks therefore inspect the still-encoded string and do not recognize the javascript: scheme, so the attribute is serialized and stored as-is. When the administrator's browser parses the stored markup, it decodes the numeric entity (browsers ignore an unlimited number of leading zeros), reconstructing a live javascript: URI:
<iframe src="javascript:..."> -> src="javascript:..."A secondary weakness contributed to the impact: the checks were performed against a canonicalized copy of the value, while the original, un-canonicalized value was the one serialized and stored, so any gap between the sanitizer's decoder and the browser's decoder became exploitable.
Proof of concept
- Open the public Contact form while unauthenticated:
index.php?language=vi&nv=contact - Submit the form with the
fconfield set to the URL-encoded payload: ``%3Ciframe%20src%3D%22%26%23x0000000006a%3Bavascript%3Aparent.location.href%3D%27https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2F%27%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E`` - The message is accepted and stored.
- When an administrator opens the message in the admin panel, the injected JavaScript executes in the administration origin.
Note: exploitation requires
iframe(or another tag carrying a URL-bearing attribute such asa,object, orembed) to be present in the site's allowed HTML tags.iframeis included in the defaultNV_ALLOWED_HTML_TAGSlist.
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is an unauthenticated stored XSS (CWE-79). Any site running an affected version whose administrators view Contact messages is impacted.
Because the injected script runs inside the administrator's authenticated, same-origin session, it can:
- read and exfiltrate data visible to the victim account (Contact messages, and other admin content reachable via same-origin requests);
- perform administrative write actions that do not require password re-authentication, by reading anti-CSRF tokens directly from the page DOM.
The impact is bounded by existing platform controls: the PHP session cookie is enforced as HttpOnly (so the session identifier cannot be read via document.cookie), and sensitive operations are gated by a password re-authentication step. The attack is therefore confined to in-browser session-riding for the duration of the victim's session rather than a persistent account takeover.
Severity: High — CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
CWE:
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') — primary
- CWE-172: Encoding Error (incomplete canonicalization before validation) — contributing
- CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs — contributing
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Yes. The sanitizer in vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php has been fixed:
- The leading-zero bounds
{0,8}in the numeric-entity decoding regular expressions were replaced with*, so any number of leading zeros is decoded, matching browser behavior. - An independent browser-equivalent verification step was added in
filterAttr(): the value that is actually stored is re-decoded with PHP's nativehtml_entity_decode()(ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5), control/whitespace characters that browsers strip from URLs are removed, and the result is rejected if it resolves to a script-executing scheme (javascript:,vbscript:, etc.).
Users should upgrade to the patched release that includes this fix.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Until the patch is applied, one or more of the following reduce exposure:
- Remove
iframe(and, if not required,object/embed) from the allowed HTML tags in Admin → Settings so URL-bearing rich-HTML tags cannot be submitted through public forms. - Apply the sanitizer changes described above directly to
vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php. - Configure a strict Content-Security-Policy for the administration area (for example, a
script-srcwithout'unsafe-inline') as a defense-in-depth layer. Note that in the default configuration CSP is not applied to the main admin HTML documents, so this requires additional wiring.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Affected file:
vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php - NukeViet CMS project: github.com/
nukeviet/ nukeviet - CWE-79: cwe.mitre.org/
data/ definitions/ 79.html - CWE-172: cwe.mitre.org/
data/ definitions/ 172.html - CWE-184: cwe.mitre.org/
data/ definitions/ 184.html