# GHSA-6JR9-6VW5-XJF6: Found during a routine audit of main at 888b83c926

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-04
- Modified: 2026-11-04

## Affected versions

- com.arcadedb:arcadedb-mcp (Maven): through 26.10.2

## Description

Found during a routine audit of main at `888b83c926`. Reported privately per SECURITY.md. Reproduced, output verbatim below.

## The weakness

The MCP permission model has a distinct `allowSchemaChange` flag, which an operator sets precisely to narrow an agent below what its database user could do. `ExecuteCommandTool` gates on it through the engine's operation-type analysis. The two upsert tools do not.

`upsert_entity` and `upsert_relationship` build a Cypher MERGE and run it through `MCPToolUtils.executeParameterizedWrite` (mcp/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/mcp/tools/MCPToolUtils.java:309-325), which analyzes the generated statement and gates it the same way. A MERGE naming a type that does not exist analyzes as `{CREATE, UPDATE}` and not as a schema change, but executing it creates the type.

So a caller holding insert and update, and explicitly denied schema change, creates arbitrary new types.

The tool descriptions advertise the auto-creation ("Created automatically if it does not exist", `UpsertEntityTool.java:52`, `UpsertRelationshipTool.java:53`), so the behaviour is intended. What is not intended is that it is not gated.

## Reproduction

`allowSchemaChange=false`, `allowInsert` and `allowUpdate` true, root as the caller so that no engine-side grant is in the way and the only gate under test is the MCP one:

```
PROBE-MCP type exists before = false
PROBE-MCP execute_command CREATE VERTEX TYPE -> SecurityException: Schema change operations are not allowed by MCP configuration
PROBE-MCP upsert_entity -> {"records":[{"@rid":"#28:0","@type":"AuditR25NewType","@cat":"v","id":"x1"}],"count":1}
PROBE-MCP type exists after = true
```

The same server, the same flag, the same schema change: refused through one tool and performed through another.

## Refutation attempted

**Does the ArcadeDB-side ACL still stop a non-root caller?** It stops a caller without the engine grant. It does not restore `allowSchemaChange`, which is a separate MCP-level restriction with its own documented purpose.

**Is the type created only because root was used?** No. The gate under test runs before the engine ACL and is identical for every caller. Root only removes the second, unrelated gate from the picture.

**Could `analyze()` be expected to report SCHEMA here?** It cannot know: whether the MERGE creates a type depends on the schema at execution time, not on the statement text. That is why the fix belongs in the tool and not in the analyzer.

## Fix, and the guarantee

In both upsert tools, check whether each named type, and for `upsert_relationship` the edge type, already exists before building the statement, and require `allowSchemaChange` when one does not. Likewise for a property the SET clause would add, if the MCP model intends to cover properties.

The guarantee we would ask for: a test that enumerates every tool able to reach the engine with a write, taken from `MCPDispatcher`'s own registry rather than a hand-written list, and asserts that with `allowSchemaChange=false` no tool leaves the schema different from how it found it, comparing the full schema before and after. A per-tool assertion on a single statement shape is what let these two through.

## Scope

Executed for `upsert_entity` creating a vertex type, output above. `upsert_relationship` was read and not run: it builds two node MERGEs and an edge MERGE through the same `appendNodeMerge` and `executeParameterizedWrite` path (`UpsertRelationshipTool.java:88-100`), so the same gap is expected for its vertex and edge types, but we did not drive it. Whether a property added by the SET clause counts as a schema change under this model was also not measured.

## Dedup

Nothing matching in the last 1000 issue titles. GHSA-6x73-v3rc-f57c (principal binding) and GHSA-pff6-hp53-pj54 (server-admin tools) are the two MCP authorization advisories already fixed. Both are about who the caller is; this is about which operation the configuration permits.


## Related advisories

This issue is tracked together with [GHSA-r946-225c-5x88](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-r946-225c-5x88), which carries the CVE identifier for the group.

## References

- https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-6jr9-6vw5-xjf6

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-6JR9-6VW5-XJF6
