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NTFS .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION alias bypass writes into the active gitdir in isomorphic-git 1.38.6

GHSA-6FXM-H49M-4FG3Published Updated GitHub

Description

isomorphic-git@1.38.6 incompletely implements Git's reserved .git pathname validation. Its tree parser rejects literal and normalized .git names and selected NTFS 8.3 aliases, but it does not reject a colon after .git.

On Windows NTFS, the directory name:

.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION

aliases the real .git directory. A repository containing that tree entry can therefore cause clone() or checkout to write attacker-controlled files into trusted repository metadata. In the demonstrated proof, the clone replaces the real .git/config and writes a batch file under the real .git/hooks directory. A subsequent ordinary native git status reads the poisoned core.fsmonitor value and executes the marker-only batch file.

The guaranteed vulnerability is the gitdir write during isomorphic-git checkout. The command-execution step is a follow-on action by native Git or another compatible tool; isomorphic-git does not itself execute the hook.

The crafted tree may be rejected by hosting platforms that enforce Git fsck's hasDotgit check. The PoC therefore uses a researcher-controlled loopback Smart HTTP remote. The realistic reach is an untrusted or compromised self-hosted remote, a permissive Git service, or a malicious object stream introduced in transit—not necessarily a repository hosted on GitHub.com.

Affected product

  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package: isomorphic-git
  • Affected version tested: 1.38.6
  • Published package commit: 823843d1cd19182df79bc907c767f5bcecb39a0b
  • npm tarball SHA-256: d2547d46c0a23ef9fc6fb2052e01ff78c348ceb92d394be05b146bc790943858
  • Platform required for the alias: Windows on NTFS

At the time of validation on 2026-07-10, 1.38.6 was the latest published version.

Severity

High — suggested CVSS 3.1: 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Rationale:

  • An attacker can control the repository/object stream being cloned; the supplied PoC uses self-hosted Smart HTTP because stricter hosting may reject the malformed tree during fsck.
  • No privileges in the victim environment are required.
  • The victim or automation must clone/check out the repository, and command execution requires a later compatible Git/tool action.
  • The demonstrated follow-on executes as the victim developer or CI identity.
  • Scope remains unchanged; the vulnerable workflow and impacted user account are within the same security authority.

A maintainer may choose to score only the guaranteed gitdir-write primitive lower. The report intentionally does not claim direct command execution inside isomorphic-git.

Root cause

src/models/GitTree.js in v1.38.6 normalizes entry names by removing selected HFS-ignorable characters, lowercasing, and stripping trailing dots/spaces. It then rejects:

  • path separators;
  • . and ..;
  • normalized .git; and
  • selected git~1 through git~9 aliases.

The validation does not reject .git: or other colon-suffixed forms. The published code comments state that the checks mirror native Git's is_ntfs_dotgit() behavior, but native Git specifically treats NTFS alternate stream forms as unsafe.

The checkout leading-component hardening added in the same release checks for symbolic links. It does not stop an NTFS filesystem alias because the alias resolves as a directory, not a symlink.

Reproduction

Requirements

  • A disposable Windows VM using NTFS
  • Node.js 20 or newer
  • Git for Windows on PATH
  • No third-party target; the PoC serves only on 127.0.0.1

Run

From the extracted package directory in PowerShell:

cd .\poc
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\run-poc.ps1

The script performs four checks:

  1. Builds a bare repository containing the raw root-tree entry .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION.
  2. Serves it over loopback smart HTTP through git http-backend.
  3. Clones it with exact isomorphic-git@1.38.6 and verifies that the real .git/config and real .git/hooks/vantix-fsmonitor.bat are attacker-controlled.
  4. Confirms the marker is absent, runs native git status, and verifies that VANTIX_MARKER.txt is created. It also attempts a native Git clone of the same URL as a negative control; native Git should refuse checkout.

Expected key output on Windows NTFS:

realConfigContainsFsmonitor: true
hookInRealGitdir: true
markerBeforeNativeGit: false
nativeGitStatusExit: 0
markerAfterNativeGit: true

The batch file only writes the text VANTIX_HTTP_CLONE_MARKER to a file inside the disposable victim directory.

Independently validated behavior

The published npm tarball was downloaded and hashed independently. Its SHA-256 matches the supplied evidence. A parser-level test against the exact published bundle produced the following result:

{
  ".git": { "accepted": false },
  ".GIT ": { "accepted": false },
  "git~1": { "accepted": false },
  ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION": { "accepted": true }
}

The included smart-HTTP PoC was also exercised on Linux as a transport/control check. The clone completed, but Linux created a literal .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION directory and did not overwrite .git, which matches the Windows/NTFS-specific impact claim. Native Git rejected checkout of the same crafted tree. git fsck --full also reported hasDotgit: contains '.git', confirming why strict Git hosting may block direct publication of the object.

The original Windows replay evidence records:

  • isomorphic-git@1.38.6 clone completed without error;
  • the real .git/config was overwritten;
  • the real hook file was written;
  • the marker was absent before native Git;
  • git status exited successfully and created the marker; and
  • native Git cloning the identical repository refused checkout.

Impact

A malicious repository can modify trusted repository metadata during clone or checkout on Windows NTFS. Depending on the written file, this can cause:

  • local repository configuration poisoning;
  • execution of configured commands when native Git or another compatible tool later processes the clone;
  • corruption of refs, hooks, attributes, or other gitdir state; and
  • compromise of the developer or CI account running the follow-on tool.

The proof uses core.fsmonitor because git status invokes it in a normal workflow. Other gitdir targets may provide additional integrity or availability impact. isomorphic_git_1.38.6_ntfs_alias_submission.zip

Affected versions

References

GitHub · isomorphic-git/isomorphic-git