# GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4: djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-18
- Modified: 2026-11-18

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-69138](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-69138.md): djangocms-versioning authorization bypass in version management

## Affected versions

- djangocms-versioning (PyPI): fixed in 2.6.1

## Description

## Summary

The `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could **discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on**, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).

## Details

Version state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object's own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` → `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_<model>` permission).

Two conditions were missing that check:

```python
# Before (vulnerable)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])
```

The corresponding admin views authorize **only** through these conditions:

* `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the  target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the   **unfiltered** default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.
* The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only  `is_staff`.
* `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and   never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise   delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).

Because the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.

## Impact

* **Type:** Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).
* **Who is affected:** Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold  differentiated per-object permissions.
  * Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was   effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or    edit-redirect any version.
  * Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global    `change_<model>` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) — weaker than the  intended per-object check, but not absent.
* **Consequence:** Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.

## Patches

Fixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:

```python
# After (fixed)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])
```

`discard` intentionally requires **change** permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.

Upgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.

## Workarounds

There is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.

## References

- https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/security/advisories/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4
- https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/pull/573
- https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/commit/d8c570daa5f7805e8be51f15545fe77b24c44daf
- https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning
- https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/releases/tag/2.6.1

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4
