# GHSA-5CC5-V8QV-6CW7: dir, ECDH-ES and ECDH-SS accept a non-empty JWE Encrypted Key, so token strings are malleable

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 2.3 (Low)
- Published: 2026-11-08
- Modified: 2026-11-08

## Affected versions

- web-token/jwt-library (Packagist): fixed in 3.4.13
- web-token/jwt-library (Packagist): from 4.0.0, fixed in 4.0.9
- web-token/jwt-library (Packagist): from 4.1.0, fixed in 4.1.11
- web-token/jwt-library (Packagist): from 4.2.0, fixed in 4.2.6
- web-token/jwt-framework (Packagist): fixed in 3.4.13
- web-token/jwt-framework (Packagist): from 4.0.0, fixed in 4.0.9
- web-token/jwt-framework (Packagist): from 4.1.0, fixed in 4.1.11
- web-token/jwt-framework (Packagist): from 4.2.0, fixed in 4.2.6
- web-token/jwt-encryption (Packagist): through 3.2.10

## Description

### Impact

With the `dir`, `ECDH-ES` and `ECDH-SS` key management algorithms, no key travels in the token, and the JWE Encrypted Key must be the empty octet sequence (RFC 7516, section 5.2, step 10). `JWEDecrypter` never looked at it in those modes, and the authentication tag does not cover it. A token whose encrypted key was filled with arbitrary bytes after it was issued therefore still decrypted, to the same protected header and the same plaintext, in the compact, JSON flattened and JSON general serializations. The bytes were handed to the application through `Recipient::getEncryptedKey()`.

Anyone holding one such token can derive, without any key, as many other token strings as they want, and the application accepts all of them. Nothing is disclosed and the content cannot be changed. The impact is on applications that recognise a token by its serialized string or a hash of it: a replay cache, a single-use registry or a deny-list of revoked tokens treats each variant as a new token. In the compact serialization, the token string is otherwise fixed.

### Affected configurations

Applications that decrypt JWEs whose `alg` is `dir`, `ECDH-ES` or `ECDH-SS`, whatever the content encryption algorithm and the serialization, and that identify accepted tokens by their string rather than by a claim such as `jti`. `dir` and `ECDH-ES` are reached through `JWELoader`, `NestedTokenLoader` and the bundle's decrypter services. The non-registered `ECDH-SS` algorithm is reached only through `JWEDecrypter` called with a sender key.

Not affected: the key encryption and key wrapping algorithms (`RSA-OAEP`, `RSA-OAEP-256`, `RSA1_5`, `A128KW` to `A256KW`, `A128GCMKW` to `A256GCMKW`, `PBES2-*`, `ECDH-ES+A*KW`, `ECDH-SS+A*KW`): another encrypted key gives another content encryption key, and the token is rejected. `JWEBuilder` never produces a non-empty encrypted key with a direct algorithm.

The missing check dates from the first release of the library.

### Patches

`JWEDecrypter` now rejects a token whose encrypted key is not empty when the key management algorithm is a direct encryption or a direct key agreement. The check runs with the other checks made for each key, so such a token is rejected like any token that cannot be decrypted: `decryptUsingKey()` and `decryptUsingKeySet()` return `false`, and `JWELoader` throws its usual exception.

Fixed in 3.4.13, 4.0.9, 4.1.11 and 4.2.6. 3.4.13 is the last release of the 3.4 line, which reaches its end of life with it: upgrade to 4.x to keep receiving fixes.

**Compatibility.** Tokens produced by the library are unchanged and still accepted. In the JSON serializations, an `encrypted_key` member equal to `""` is still accepted, since it decodes to the empty octet sequence. A direct-mode token whose encrypted key was filled by another producer is now rejected; conforming producers leave it empty.

### Workarounds

The confidentiality and the integrity of the content are not at stake. Until you upgrade, identify tokens by a claim such as `jti` in a replay cache, a single-use registry or a deny-list, rather than by the token string. Alternatively, after unserializing a token and before decrypting it, reject it when `alg` is `dir`, `ECDH-ES` or `ECDH-SS` and `getRecipient($index)->getEncryptedKey()` is neither `null` nor `''`.

### References

- RFC 7516, section 5.2, step 10 (JWE decryption) and section 7.2.1 (the `encrypted_key` member)
- RFC 7518, sections 4.5 (Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key) and 4.6 (ECDH-ES)

### Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-TJB4VSPK).

## References

- https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-5cc5-v8qv-6cw7

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-5CC5-V8QV-6CW7
