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Route selection uses the raw un-normalized path

GHSA-4HRH-34W3-5WW8Published Updated GitHub

Description

Route selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901.

The defect

fabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned:

// proxy/http_proxy.go
if t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) {                      // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL
    http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
    return
}
if !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) {          // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth
    http.Error(w, "authorization failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
    return
}

and the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (Path: r.URL.Path at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the protected resource.

Verification

Verified end to end against the real binary at HEAD, not a synthetic unit test. fabio was built and run with static routes against a python3 -m http.server origin, driven with curl --path-as-is: on a basic-auth route, /admin/ returned 401 without credentials and 200 with valid credentials (controls correct), while all four crafted paths returned 200 with the protected page and NO credentials; on an ACL route, /admin/ returned 403 and all four crafted variants returned 200.

Precondition, stated honestly: a less restrictive route must reach the same backend so the crafted path has somewhere to fall through to. That is exactly the two-tag urlprefix- shape fabio's own access-control documentation instructs operators to configure. Where no fallback route exists the request 404s instead.

Suggested fix

Normalize the path before route lookup: decode percent-encoded dot segments and apply path.Clean, then match. Whether the normalized or original path is forwarded upstream is a separate decision, but the LOOKUP must run on the normalized form, because the ACL and auth decisions are derived from it. Also lowercase and strip the port and any trailing dot from the request host before host matching. Secondary observations: X-Forwarded-Prefix is passed through from the client on non-strip routes; the gRPC proxy path never calls either authorization gate, so allow=/auth= on a proto=grpc route are silently unenforced.

Dedup note

The obvious residual of CVE-2025-48865 is already taken: CVE-2026-62987 / GHSA-fq95-v8xc-jm3v (published 2026-07-03) covers the Connection-header strip of proxy.header.clientip/tls/requestid, fixed in v1.7.2. Do not re-report that. The finding above is a different and independent defect.

Tooling

I used AI assistance while investigating. The bypass was reproduced against the real fabio binary with a live backend, including the 401-vs-200 and 403-vs-200 controls, and I separately confirmed at HEAD that lookup takes req.URL.Path, that both gates derive from the returned target, that the raw path is forwarded, and that path.Clean appears nowhere in the repository.

I manually verified this finding against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it; the AI assistance noted above was for the audit and the drafting.

Affected versions

References

GitHub · fabiolb/fabio