Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization
Description
Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization
Vulnerability
The disconnectUserSession endpoint in UserResourceImpl.java (line 443) accepts a realm path parameter but ignores it entirely, performing no authorization or realm-boundary check before force-disconnecting an MQTT session. Any authenticated user from any realm can disconnect MQTT broker sessions belonging to users in other realms by supplying the target session ID.
File: manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, lines 443-447
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}The REST interface at model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java (line 201-204) maps this to GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID} with no @RolesAllowed annotation, so any authenticated user (not just admins) can call it.
Root Cause
CVE-2026-54641 (commit de89b8d) fixed cross-realm information disclosure in three read methods of the same file (get(), getUserClientRoles(), getUserRealmRoles()) and also added a realm check to getClientRoles(). The fix added throwIfCannotReadUserInRealm() and throwIfCannotAdminRealm() guards. However, disconnectUserSession was not patched and remains unprotected. Every other mutating method in this class has either a @RolesAllowed annotation on the interface or an explicit realm check in the implementation. This one has neither.
Proof of Concept
Given two realms, "master" and "building":
- User A authenticates in the "building" realm (any role, no admin needed).
- User B has an active MQTT session in the "master" realm with session ID
S. - User A sends:
GET /api/master/user/master/disconnect/Swith their building-realm bearer token. - The handler ignores the realm path segments, looks up session
Sin the globalconnectionIDConnectionMap, and callsdoForceDisconnect(). User B's MQTT connection is terminated.
Session IDs use the Netty ChannelId.asLongText() format (deterministic, partially sequential). While not trivially brute-forceable, IDs can leak through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls. Within the same realm, any user (not just admins) can also disconnect sessions they should not have access to.
Impact
In a multi-tenant IoT deployment, an attacker authenticated in any realm can disrupt MQTT device connectivity in other realms. Since OpenRemote is used for building management, energy monitoring, and industrial IoT, forcibly disconnecting MQTT sessions can:
- Knock IoT sensors and actuators offline across tenant boundaries
- Disrupt safety-critical alarm monitoring (compounding the alarm IDOR fixed in CVE-2026-57168)
- Cause denial of service against other tenants' device fleets
The method also uses HTTP GET for a destructive operation, making it susceptible to CSRF via image tags or link prefetch.
Suggested Fix
Add a realm administration check consistent with the pattern used elsewhere in this file:
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm);
RemotingConnection connection = mqttBrokerService.getConnectionByID(sessionID);
if (connection == null) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
// Verify the session belongs to a user in the requested realm
// before disconnecting
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}At minimum, add throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm) as the first line, and consider adding a @RolesAllowed(Constants.WRITE_ADMIN_ROLE) annotation to the interface method. The HTTP method should also be changed from GET to DELETE.
AI tooling
I used AI assistance for the code audit and for drafting this report. I manually verified the finding against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are my own.