# GHSA-2MR3-RXRQ-238C: http.paginate follows server-supplied next-page URLs (Link header / cursor) without SSRF revalidation

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 8.5 (High)
- Published: 2026-07-11
- Modified: 2026-08-20

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-77315](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-77315.md): Flyto Core server-side request forgery in http.paginate

## Affected versions

- flyto-core (PyPI): through 2.26.7

## Description

## Summary
`http.paginate` validates only the initial `base_url`, then follows server-supplied pagination targets (RFC 5988 `Link: rel="next"` headers, cursor/offset URLs) in a loop **without revalidating each follow-up URL**. An attacker's first-page response can point `next` at an internal address, causing a second-order SSRF whose internal body is aggregated into the returned items.

## Root Cause
`src/core/modules/atomic/http/paginate.py:495` validates `base_url` (first URL only). The pagination loop `_paginate_link_header` reads `next_url` via `_parse_link_header` (:203), sets `url=next_url` (:208), and calls `session.request(method, url)` (:196) with NO validate call in the loop (:186-208 has zero guard calls).

## Impact
Readable second-order SSRF that bypasses the SSRF control; internal/metadata body aggregated into `all_items` and returned to the caller (C:H, S:C).

## Proof of Concept
Verified live: `http.paginate` with allowlisted base `127.0.0.1` followed a `Link: <http://127.0.0.3/...>; rel="next"` (non-allowlisted) and returned `INTERNAL-NEXTPAGE-SECRET` in the aggregated items.
```
execute_module http.paginate {"url":"http://attacker.tld/p1","strategy":"link_header"}
attacker p1 response header: Link: <http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/>; rel="next"
```

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: `http.paginate {url:"http://attacker.tld/p1", strategy:"link_header"}`. Guard: `validate_url_with_env_config(base_url)` (paginate.py:495) — validates the FIRST url only.
2. Sink: `_paginate_link_header` reads `next_url` (`_parse_link_header` :203), `url=next_url` (:208), `session.request(method,url)` (:196) — NO validate call in the loop. Bypass proof: only :495 validates; loop at :186-208 has zero guard calls.
3. Impact: internal body aggregated into `all_items` and returned → readable second-order SSRF.

## Bypass Evidence
Live PoC followed a `Link` header into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker in aggregated results. Only `base_url` is validated; the follow loop never revalidates.

## Affected Versions
`<= 2.26.6` — `paginate.py:495` + loop present on latest release tag.

## Suggested Fix
Run every follow-up URL (Link header, cursor, offset target) through `validate_url_with_env_config` before fetching it inside the pagination loop.

## Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

## References

- https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-2mr3-rxrq-238c

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-2MR3-RXRQ-238C
