# GHSA-2M9M-6CR5-9X25: mssql-mcp-core: SQL injection in mssql-mcp write tools via unparameterized table names and WHERE clauses

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: high (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-19
- Modified: 2026-11-19

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-63129](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-63129.md): ConnorBritain SQL injection in write tools via table names and filters

## Affected versions

- @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core (npm): fixed in 0.6.0
- @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-reader (npm): fixed in 0.5.0
- @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-writer (npm): fixed in 0.5.0
- @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-server (npm): fixed in 0.6.0

## Description

Several tools in `mssql-mcp-core` built T-SQL by string-interpolating caller-supplied identifiers and predicates directly into the statement passed to the node-mssql `Request.query()` batch API. Only data values were parameterized.

Affected tools and inputs:
- `update_data`, `delete_data`: `tableName` and the free-form `whereClause` were interpolated raw.
- `insert_data`: `tableName` and column names (object keys) were interpolated raw.
- `execute_transaction`: the same raw `tableName`/`whereClause` interpolation per operation.
- `create_table`, `create_index`, `drop_table`: table/column/index/schema identifiers were interpolated with no or insufficient validation.
- `list_databases` (reader tier): the `stateFilter` argument was interpolated raw into the query, with only a non-enforced inputSchema enum guarding it.

The only check on `whereClause` was that it was non-empty. Because the row-count and preview queries run before the `confirmUpdate`/`confirmDelete` step, a malicious `whereClause` or `tableName` executed on the first call, bypassing the preview/confirmation and `maxRows` safety controls. `Request.query()` submits a multi-statement T-SQL batch, so a crafted input enabled stacked statements (arbitrary DDL/DML), sub-selects, and (with a privileged login and `xp_cmdshell` enabled) OS command execution. Because `list_databases` is a read-only tool, the `stateFilter` sink makes the reader package injectable as well.

## Impact

An actor who can supply tool arguments (a malicious or compromised MCP client, or an LLM agent steered via indirect prompt injection) could read, modify, or drop arbitrary data, bypass the `read_data` allow/deny validation and the preview/confirmation/`maxRows` safeguards, and conditionally achieve OS command execution.

## Patches

Fixed in `@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core` 0.6.0:
- All identifiers are validated against a strict allowlist and bracket-quoted via a shared helper.
- The free-form `whereClause` string parameter is removed (breaking change) and replaced with structured, parameterized filters (`{ column, operator, value }`) using an operator allowlist. Values are always bound, never interpolated.
- `list_databases` validates `stateFilter` against a fixed allowlist before use.

Upgrade the consumer packages: `mssql-mcp-reader` 0.5.0, `mssql-mcp-writer` 0.5.0, `mssql-mcp-server` 0.6.0 (all depend on core `^0.6.0`).

## Workarounds

Upgrading is the only complete fix; the `list_databases` (`stateFilter`) sink is reachable even under `READONLY=true` and in the reader package. As defense in depth, run the server under a least-privilege SQL login with `xp_cmdshell` disabled, and restrict which MCP clients can invoke the tools.

## References

- https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/security/advisories/GHSA-2m9m-6cr5-9x25
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63129
- https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/pull/1
- https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/commit/227e2efc4e3311c477b7ae509c3ae15437a4f815
- https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/commit/a9727f83768598e4fdbddfbc717ccfebb84ae7af
- https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-2M9M-6CR5-9X25
