Description
Several tools in mssql-mcp-core built T-SQL by string-interpolating caller-supplied identifiers and predicates directly into the statement passed to the node-mssql Request.query() batch API. Only data values were parameterized.
Affected tools and inputs:
update_data,delete_data:tableNameand the free-formwhereClausewere interpolated raw.insert_data:tableNameand column names (object keys) were interpolated raw.execute_transaction: the same rawtableName/whereClauseinterpolation per operation.create_table,create_index,drop_table: table/column/index/schema identifiers were interpolated with no or insufficient validation.list_databases(reader tier): thestateFilterargument was interpolated raw into the query, with only a non-enforced inputSchema enum guarding it.
The only check on whereClause was that it was non-empty. Because the row-count and preview queries run before the confirmUpdate/confirmDelete step, a malicious whereClause or tableName executed on the first call, bypassing the preview/confirmation and maxRows safety controls. Request.query() submits a multi-statement T-SQL batch, so a crafted input enabled stacked statements (arbitrary DDL/DML), sub-selects, and (with a privileged login and xp_cmdshell enabled) OS command execution. Because list_databases is a read-only tool, the stateFilter sink makes the reader package injectable as well.
Impact
An actor who can supply tool arguments (a malicious or compromised MCP client, or an LLM agent steered via indirect prompt injection) could read, modify, or drop arbitrary data, bypass the read_data allow/deny validation and the preview/confirmation/maxRows safeguards, and conditionally achieve OS command execution.
Patches
Fixed in @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core 0.6.0:
- All identifiers are validated against a strict allowlist and bracket-quoted via a shared helper.
- The free-form
whereClausestring parameter is removed (breaking change) and replaced with structured, parameterized filters ({ column, operator, value }) using an operator allowlist. Values are always bound, never interpolated. list_databasesvalidatesstateFilteragainst a fixed allowlist before use.
Upgrade the consumer packages: mssql-mcp-reader 0.5.0, mssql-mcp-writer 0.5.0, mssql-mcp-server 0.6.0 (all depend on core ^0.6.0).
Workarounds
Upgrading is the only complete fix; the list_databases (stateFilter) sink is reachable even under READONLY=true and in the reader package. As defense in depth, run the server under a least-privilege SQL login with xp_cmdshell disabled, and restrict which MCP clients can invoke the tools.
Affected versions
fixed in 0.6.0
fixed in 0.5.0
fixed in 0.5.0
fixed in 0.6.0