# GHSA-2CVJ-X8HG-6WCQ: Remote Code Execution via image-upload bypass chain (PHP short-tag detection bypass + double-extension filename)

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 7.5 (High)
- Published: 2026-10-02
- Modified: 2026-10-02

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-94597](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-94597.md): NukeViet remote code execution via image upload filter bypass

## Affected versions

- nukeviet/nukeviet (Packagist): through 4.5.11

## Description

### Impact

This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability (`CWE-434`) reachable through NukeViet's file-upload pipeline (`NukeViet\Files\Upload::save_file()`).
The pipeline is used by the admin uploader and by user-facing endpoints: avatar, banner, and comment attachments (when enabled).

An attacker uploads a valid image (for example a GIF) with PHP code appended after the image data - a polyglot - and passes every upload check by chaining four weaknesses:

1. `verify_image()` scanned only for the `<?php` and `<?=` tags and missed the `<?` short-open tag (`CWE-184`).
2. The filename sanitizer preserved dots, so `shell.php.jpg` kept its embedded `.php`.
3. Extension validation inspected only the last extension.
4. The generated `.htaccess` rule blocked `.php` only at the end of the URI, so `shell.php.jpg` was not blocked (`CWE-184`).

On servers configured with `short_open_tag = On` and Apache `mod_php` using `AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .php`, the uploaded file is executed as PHP.
This yields arbitrary OS command execution as the web-server user (for example `www-data`): full site compromise, disclosure of database credentials, arbitrary file read/write, and pivoting into the internal network or the cloud metadata service.

Who is impacted:

- Any NukeViet 4.6.x site running that Apache/mod_php configuration is exposed to full RCE.
- Sites on PHP-FPM, `SetHandler` / `FilesMatch \.php$`, nginx, or OpenLiteSpeed are not exposed to the execution step, but the upload-validation defects still apply as defense-in-depth issues.

### Patches

Yes. The issue is fixed in the next release (commit `570307107`).
The fix hardens the upload pipeline at the application layer, so protection no longer depends on the web-server configuration:

- `verify_image()` now also detects the `<?` short-open tag. It normalizes the matched snippet to `<?php ` before tokenizing, so detection is independent of the scanning server's `short_open_tag` setting and the polyglot is rejected at upload time.
- The upload filename sanitizer and the rename endpoint no longer keep dots in the name part, so a stored file can never carry an embedded `.php`.
- The `.htaccess` rewrite rule now blocks the dangerous extensions anywhere in the path (double-extension included) and also covers `php[0-9]?`, `phtml`, and `phar`.

Users should upgrade to the patched release.

### Workarounds

These are mitigations only - the robust fix is to upgrade, because the underlying weakness is in the upload-validation and filename logic, not in the web-server configuration.

- On Apache with `mod_php`, set `php_flag engine off` (or remove the handler with `RemoveHandler`) for the `uploads/` directory.
- Or migrate to PHP-FPM / `SetHandler` with a `<FilesMatch "\.php$">` rule, so that only files ending in `.php` are ever handed to the interpreter.
- Disabling `short_open_tag` also prevents the specific short-tag payload.

### References

- Fix commit: `570307107`
- Original report: GHSA-2cvj-x8hg-6wcq
- CWE-434: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html
- CWE-184: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html
- Apache `mod_mime` (multiple-extension handler behavior): https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_mime.html

## References

- https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-2cvj-x8hg-6wcq

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-2CVJ-X8HG-6WCQ
