Remote Code Execution via image-upload bypass chain (PHP short-tag detection bypass + double-extension filename)
Description
Impact
This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability (CWE-434) reachable through NukeViet's file-upload pipeline (NukeViet\Files\Upload::save_file()). The pipeline is used by the admin uploader and by user-facing endpoints: avatar, banner, and comment attachments (when enabled).
An attacker uploads a valid image (for example a GIF) with PHP code appended after the image data - a polyglot - and passes every upload check by chaining four weaknesses:
verify_image()scanned only for the<?phpand<?=tags and missed the<?short-open tag (CWE-184).- The filename sanitizer preserved dots, so
shell.php.jpgkept its embedded.php. - Extension validation inspected only the last extension.
- The generated
.htaccessrule blocked.phponly at the end of the URI, soshell.php.jpgwas not blocked (CWE-184).
On servers configured with short_open_tag = On and Apache mod_php using AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .php, the uploaded file is executed as PHP. This yields arbitrary OS command execution as the web-server user (for example www-data): full site compromise, disclosure of database credentials, arbitrary file read/write, and pivoting into the internal network or the cloud metadata service.
Who is impacted:
- Any NukeViet 4.6.x site running that Apache/mod_php configuration is exposed to full RCE.
- Sites on PHP-FPM,
SetHandler/FilesMatch \.php$, nginx, or OpenLiteSpeed are not exposed to the execution step, but the upload-validation defects still apply as defense-in-depth issues.
Patches
Yes. The issue is fixed in the next release (commit 570307107). The fix hardens the upload pipeline at the application layer, so protection no longer depends on the web-server configuration:
verify_image()now also detects the<?short-open tag. It normalizes the matched snippet to<?phpbefore tokenizing, so detection is independent of the scanning server'sshort_open_tagsetting and the polyglot is rejected at upload time.- The upload filename sanitizer and the rename endpoint no longer keep dots in the name part, so a stored file can never carry an embedded
.php. - The
.htaccessrewrite rule now blocks the dangerous extensions anywhere in the path (double-extension included) and also coversphp[0-9]?,phtml, andphar.
Users should upgrade to the patched release.
Workarounds
These are mitigations only - the robust fix is to upgrade, because the underlying weakness is in the upload-validation and filename logic, not in the web-server configuration.
- On Apache with
mod_php, setphp_flag engine off(or remove the handler withRemoveHandler) for theuploads/directory. - Or migrate to PHP-FPM /
SetHandlerwith a<FilesMatch "\.php$">rule, so that only files ending in.phpare ever handed to the interpreter. - Disabling
short_open_tagalso prevents the specific short-tag payload.
References
- Fix commit:
570307107 - Original report: GHSA-2cvj-x8hg-6wcq
- CWE-434: cwe.mitre.org/
data/ definitions/ 434.html - CWE-184: cwe.mitre.org/
data/ definitions/ 184.html - Apache
mod_mime(multiple-extension handler behavior): httpd.apache.org/docs/ 2.4/ mod/ mod_mime.html