dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow in inline mode with large tag size
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow in inline mode with large tag size In inline mode, dm_integrity_check and dm_integrity_inline_recheck compute the checksum of each block into an on-stack buffer of HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE bytes. integrity_sector_checksum pads its result with zeroes up to the tag size, so if the tag size is larger than HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, the padding runs past the end of the buffer. With CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR the kernel panics in dm_integrity_check on the first read. Enlarge both buffers to hold MAX_TAG_SIZE bytes, as commit b93b6643e9b5 ("dm integrity: fix a crash with unusually large tag size") did for integrity_metadata. Note that this is not a security bug because the buffer overflow can only be triggered by root.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 · fixed in 3c7aad85aeb9e28386672e3a009aa2e61f751b86; From fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 · fixed in 4f0ee735dc68e3e6c4dd9a666d7f7047163c4165; From fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 · fixed in f49cd7820cd0a96f20e1aa2708adb002124e38a7; From fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 · fixed in 764b683a6180fd72c931c13fea98d383506a3475
- Linux Linux
6.11