memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete. Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue(): INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host. The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

Timeline

1. Oct 23, 2026, 12:21 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 23, 2026, 12:45 PM UTCFirst seen by cve.now
3. Oct 30, 2026, 12:41 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  Version range not reported

• Linux Linux

  3.16

• KernelLinux

  From 3.16.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.113; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.57; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.11

References 8