namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.9, 6.6.160, 6.12.114, 6.18.57, 7.2.11
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The Linux kernel's mount and namespace handling code is affected, specifically how mount locking is applied when automounted filesystems are attached across user and mount namespaces. The flaw can cause a mount to be locked in the wrong namespace, so a host's mount flags can become unchangeable or a namespace can end up with a mount whose locks don't match its owner.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt() locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories. The user namespace is taken from the caller's mount namespaces since this is where the mounts end up. Except, that's not always true. Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a different mount and user namespace during path lookup. Then check doesn't make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace of the parent - which may be the host's - is now locked and the host cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore. Here's the reproducer: • host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared • tracefs automount below it is not yet active • hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount • child process enters auser and mount namespace • child process' namespace now holds a locked copy of the host's debugfs mount that receives propagation from it • child process stats "tracing/." through the descriptor • lookup runs on the host's mount so the automount lands below the host's mount • propagation puts a copy below the child's copy • both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount: host, on its own automount: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM child, on the copy in its namespace: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = 0 So the lock landed on the host's mount instead of the child's copy. Congrats. So we need to compare with the owner of the namespace the mount actually gets mounted on. For all regular cases that is the caller's mount namespace and so nothing changes. Detached trees in anonymous mount namespaces by be handed over via SCM_RIGHTS or inherited in other ways on purpose so the attaching task's mount namespace is authoritative, not the creator of the detached tree.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 · fixed in 5e8f3ac8fa3d411b422ad32b9168c46a4824cc79; From 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 · fixed in b3ccde78f1608836e62320428abc0e8aa9cf2329; From 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 · fixed in e01c79761c7b3373e80094c5eadb21cb864fa8bc; From 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 · fixed in 6ab37fae14196ba2262b152a7d9222c50356d278; From 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 · fixed in 33aadc7c72055fca93cb5a3691d836ebf8b31c9b; From 3.8.6 · fixed in 3.9
- Linux Linux
3.9
- KernelLinux
From 3.9.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.114; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.57; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.11