namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.2.11
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The Linux kernel's mount namespace handling is affected, specifically how locked mounts are treated when a propagated mount is moved beneath them. The flaw could let a user namespace owner unmount a locked cover and expose files that should stay hidden, such as a secret under a mountpoint in the host's shared mount.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it: Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */ H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /* Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */ Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is unmounted again.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d · fixed in f1f0c24ca701d7d3061c7f69f7450f1734c11745; From c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d · fixed in d74d66aa708ccf2bc0b1e265a83fed0f2308d5c4
- Linux Linux
7.1
- KernelLinux
From 7.1.0 · fixed in 7.2.11