net/sched: cls_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.6.160, 6.12.113, 6.18.56, 7.2.10
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path Two racing tc filter add requests on the same chain/prio of an unlocked classifier both run change() on the shared proto and both can fail: the winner's tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() attempt gives up because the loser's handle is still in the idr, and the loser's error path drops only its own reference without a second reclamation attempt. The empty proto stays linked in the chain, holding the chain reference, a block reference and the classifier module reference until the chain or block is torn down. Reclaim the proto on the error path of any failed request that holds a proto reference. The reclamation is emptiness-gated: tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() unlinks the proto only when delete_empty() admits it is empty, so a live shared proto is never unlinked. A proto the request created is reclaimed unconditionally - it is the only owner, so marking it for deletion is safe even without a delete_empty callback. Classifiers without one (the check marks the proto unconditionally) are rtnl-serialized, so the raced window this guard closes cannot arise for them. This is a follow-up to commit d4e359b3608a ("net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss"), which stopped the loser of the insert race from unlinking the winner's live proto but left the empty-proto residual in place. Conditions to recreate: • CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOWER=y; veth pair • tc qdisc add dev veth0 ingress • two concurrent `tc filter add dev veth0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 flower skip_sw ... action drop` (both fail in fl_hw_replace_filter after publishing their handle in the idr); repeat in a loop • an empty flower tp stays linked after both requests fail; visible as a bare `filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0` header in `tc filter show` with no filter entries • CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices)
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
5.1
- KernelLinux
From 5.1.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.113; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.56; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.10
References 7
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/0f005c9b8b2e4c018e598cbaf490f27bebfd3d1f
- stable/c/00ad96ee96760d2f12f8c4b3a43f6c6b742c452f
- stable/c/0fc74e7d97d232095ce64cb45d25f0919df7ad4a
- stable/c/315e4fe65cf02ef052de5e6298c3088e448b7517
- stable/c/ebc9611ab154c0cd9f1320e2a73f5e936d7535a9
- stable/c/570141625d212fbbcffb9665cb45c0f04610e61a
- stable/c/0bb8eab29b55045281a4963d4557f2776cdf8cfa