Bluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.2.8
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access btmtksdio.c and btmtkuart.c cast a received WMT event straight to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt and read its op/flag fields without checking the event is long enough to contain them, unlike btmtk.c. The FUNC_CTRL case then further casts to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc and reads its 2-byte status field, again without a length check. Firmware that sends a short or malformed WMT event makes both drivers read past the end of the received SKB. Mirror btmtk.c: validate the base WMT header with skb_pull_data() before touching any of its fields, and when a FUNC_CTRL event turns out to be the short, header-only form (a plain enable/disable ack with no status word), decode the result from the header's own flag byte instead (0 = success, otherwise failure). Verified setup on MT7920, MT7921, MT7922 and MT7925: no regression.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From e0b67035a90b58d01f911fed77b6e3da153da66e · fixed in 5a5cfd8488c97e1b8939515429fe4c81e9f2df4f; From e0b67035a90b58d01f911fed77b6e3da153da66e · fixed in 8879e3e0a84a86954c855caceead4867e74a9a27
- Linux Linux
5.1
- KernelLinux
From 5.1.0 · fixed in 7.2.8