tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.6.158, 6.12.111, 6.18.53, 7.2.7
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the ".stacktrace" modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace. create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record. event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and copies that many longs into a 31 entry array: n_entries = *stack; memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long)); Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event holds at the offset, so any field will do: cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork echo 'hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace' > trigger (true) BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130 timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0 enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30 event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690 The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over. No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes. Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already states the rule, "must be a long[] type", so enforce it once the name has been resolved. Names which resolve to no field at all, "hitcount.stacktrace" and the common_* pseudo-fields, are refused for the same reason: they hold no stacktrace to read.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From cc5fc8bfc961eeb99b7e8dffbeff7a3f6995d314 · fixed in 98da3379cdee343f671dac89b9afbd8b071f2591; From cc5fc8bfc961eeb99b7e8dffbeff7a3f6995d314 · fixed in e183b84968d4a6ea476d806ea97668405aa56880; From cc5fc8bfc961eeb99b7e8dffbeff7a3f6995d314 · fixed in 57bfc2a17954d173d2a4182f3b582ffbb23aff64; From cc5fc8bfc961eeb99b7e8dffbeff7a3f6995d314 · fixed in 55caaf25da2c2bb9b75307e4c868726cb954b1d6; From cc5fc8bfc961eeb99b7e8dffbeff7a3f6995d314 · fixed in a5e70ba87ca8ebc79b4e63de302d03b0625fe153
- Linux Linux
6.3
- KernelLinux
From 6.3.0 · fixed in 6.6.158; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.111; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.53; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.7