ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.6.160, 6.12.111, 6.18.53, 7.2.7
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible ctl_snapshot[] array. Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer, and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short transfers while still resubmitting the URB.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · fixed in c3576cb77b527f223cf2b9fc2b2e9af5e7adee25; From 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · fixed in c156584999bf15118f523ef6c6fedc5b21f46bd9; From 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · fixed in b0c30fe6c0d5902bd8a7d1d5720bead5bbe46f7d; From 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · fixed in 2770321b358658e0a39fe39ccf6a91ee97a81931; From 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · fixed in 8f5ef203abda9dd36b2af473c7b737d544f807bd
- Linux Linux
2.6.12
- KernelLinux
From 2.6.12 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.111; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.53; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.7