Viewer role can create, modify and delete Loki alerting rules
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Grafana's data source proxy did not apply role-based access control to write requests forwarded to Loki data sources. A user holding only the Viewer role on an affected Grafana instance could send POST, PUT and DELETE requests through the proxy to the Loki rules API (/loki/api/v1/rules), allowing them to create, modify and delete Loki alerting rules. Because those rules are stored by Loki rather than by Grafana, the change took effect for every user of that Loki data source, not only for the Viewer who made the request. Exploitation requires an authenticated Viewer account on the Grafana instance and a configured Loki data source; no other privileges are needed. Both Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise are affected. The defect is in Grafana's data source proxy; Loki itself is not vulnerable and does not need to be patched.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Grafana Grafana Enterprise
From 8.0.0 · through 11.5.10; From 11.6.0 · through 11.6.16; From 12.0.0 · through 12.1.10; From 12.2.0 · through 12.2.10; From 12.3.0 · through 12.3.8; From 12.4.0 · through 12.4.5; From 13.0.0 · through 13.0.3
- Grafana Grafana OSS
From 12.3.0 · through 12.3.8; From 12.4.0 · through 12.4.5; From 8.0.0 · through 12.3.0; From 13.0.0 · through 13.0.3