MISP: PHP phar stream wrapper enables deserialization and code execution via caller-influenced filesystem paths
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.47
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
MISP ships with PHP's phar stream wrapper registered in both its web entry point and its console entry point. The phar stream wrapper causes PHP to treat a phar archive as a directory, which has two security consequences: - any filesystem operation on a caller-influenced path that resolves to a phar archive triggers an implicit unserialize() call, creating a deserialization sink; - a relocated application root can reach executable code inside an uploaded phar file, enabling arbitrary code execution as the web user. No component of MISP, the vendored CakePHP framework, or any runtime-loaded library reads or constructs phar archives. The wrapper therefore serves no legitimate purpose in the MISP runtime and exists solely as an available primitive for an attacker who can influence a filesystem path argument.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- MISP MISP
fixed in 2.5.47