MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)

Summary

The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:   - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked  -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication  - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry. The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance. Version affected: <2.5.47

Timeline

1. Sep 21, 2026, 12:35 PM UTCCVE published
2. Sep 21, 2026, 3:20 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

3. Sep 21, 2026, 3:21 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• MISP MISP

  fixed in 2.5.47

References 1