In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the std.ssh_proxied action passes a caller-supplied proxy_command value directly to paramiko.ProxyComma
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 20.1.1, 21.0.1, 22.0.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the std.ssh_proxied action passes a caller-supplied proxy_command value directly to paramiko.ProxyCommand() before any SSH connection to a gateway or target host is attempted. An authenticated project member can use the standard action-execution API to submit an arbitrary local command as proxy_command; paramiko starts that command as a subprocess on the executor host under the executor's own service account, independent of whether the SSH connection itself ever succeeds. Only Mistral deployments that permit the std.ssh_proxied action, the default configuration, are affected.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenStack Mistral
fixed in 20.1.1; From 21.0.0 · fixed in 21.0.1; From 22.0.0 · fixed in 22.0.1