rustls webpki 0.101.0 before 0.103.12 Name Constraint Bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.103.12, 0.104.0-alpha.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
rustls-webpki (the Rust webpki fork used by rustls) versions >= 0.101.0 and prior to 0.103.12 and 0.104.0-alpha.6 incorrectly accepted permitted-subtree DNS name constraints for certificates asserting a wildcard name. For example, a name constraint of accept.example.com was treated as satisfied by a certificate for *.example.com, which could feasibly assert reject.example.com — a name outside the permitted subtree. Because name constraints are restrictions applied to otherwise properly issued certificates, the issue is only reachable after signature verification succeeds and requires a misissued wildcard certificate to exploit.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rustls webpki
From 0.101.0 · fixed in 0.103.12; From 0.104.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 0.104.0-alpha.6
- rustls-webpkicrates.io
From 0.101.0 · fixed in 0.103.12
- rustls-webpkicrates.io
From 0.104.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 0.104.0-alpha.6
- rustls-webpkicrates.io
From 0.0.0-0 · fixed in 0.103.12; From 0.104.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 0.104.0-alpha.6