dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache->segments[] with it without checking it against cache->n_segs. That metadata is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data. Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array. Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs) rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs <= seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images are unaffected.

Timeline

1. Sep 17, 2026, 4:12 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 19, 2026, 9:07 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  From 1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 · fixed in 96d4b275281b45aacd0f0510fa8bec85d9f7dc5a; From 1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 · fixed in b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4; From 1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 · fixed in 90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098

• Linux Linux

  6.18

• KernelLinux

  From 6.18.0 · fixed in 6.18.57; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.6

References 3