fs/resctrl: Prevent use-after-free in rdtgroup_kn_put()
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.15, 4.20, 5.5, 5.6, 6.6.160, and 3 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/resctrl: Prevent use-after-free in rdtgroup_kn_put() A struct rdtgroup is reference counted via rdtgroup::waitcount. Callers that need the structure to remain valid across a sleep (while waiting on acquiring rdtgroup_mutex) take a reference with rdtgroup_kn_get() and release it with rdtgroup_kn_put(). The release path is intended to serve as the fallback freer: if the count drops to zero and the group has already been marked RDT_DELETED, rdtgroup_kn_put() frees the structure. The bulk teardown paths free_all_child_rdtgrp() and rmdir_all_sub() resulting from a resctrl directory remove or resctrl fs unmount act as the primary freer: they hold rdtgroup_mutex and free each rdtgroup whose waitcount is zero, otherwise they set RDT_DELETED and leave the freeing to the last waiter. These two freers race. rdtgroup_kn_put() commits waitcount == 0 with atomic_dec_and_test() outside rdtgroup_mutex, then reads rdtgroup::flags. Between those two operations a concurrent caller of free_all_child_rdtgrp() or rmdir_all_sub() (which holds the mutex) can observe waitcount == 0 via atomic_read(), call rdtgroup_remove(), and kfree() the structure. The subsequent read of rdtgroup::flags in rdtgroup_kn_put() is then a use-after-free, and the structure may even be freed twice if the freed memory happens to satisfy the RDT_DELETED flag check. Replace the bare atomic_dec_and_test() with atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock() so that the decrement-to-zero takes rdtgroup_mutex before the count becomes globally visible. The inspection of rdtgroup::flags then runs under the same mutex held by the bulk freers, making the two paths mutually exclusive. The common case where the count does not reach zero remains lock-free. Defer kernfs_unbreak_active_protection() until after the mutex is dropped since kernfs active protections functionally wrap rdtgroup_mutex. Remove resource group, which in turn drops its kernfs reference, after kernfs protection is restored. [ bp: Split the commit messsages into smaller, easier-parseable paragraphs. ]
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From b8511ccc75c033f6d54188ea4df7bf1e85778740 · fixed in 971b40e3ca1279ca4917889e0195d33b66d071a4; From b8511ccc75c033f6d54188ea4df7bf1e85778740 · fixed in 828ff461c136b95d13b8d712c0a7a06a640e313a; From b8511ccc75c033f6d54188ea4df7bf1e85778740 · fixed in ae69f936e8ffed553d899ba4c02f8a7461a89e54; From b8511ccc75c033f6d54188ea4df7bf1e85778740 · fixed in 4c593c62c1499665baebbb41b70e2c9b7e947b86; From b8511ccc75c033f6d54188ea4df7bf1e85778740 · fixed in f5bcf539484d2d604c2f2330e09487ea090b21c7; From 4.14.170 · fixed in 4.15; From 4.19.102 · fixed in 4.20; From 5.4.18 · fixed in 5.5; From 5.5.2 · fixed in 5.6
- Linux Linux
5.6
- KernelLinux
From 5.6.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.114; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.52; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.6