PNG decoder: a duplicate IHDR chunk after IDAT resizes the image after allocation, causing a heap out-of-bounds write
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
The PNG chunk reader has no notion of chunk ordering. It records whether an IDAT has been seen and whether a tRNS has already supplied transparency, but nothing prevents an IHDR being read a second time. A PNG carries exactly one IHDR and it is the first chunk. A file that places a second one after IDAT rewrites the image width, height, bit depth and pixel depth after the decoded-data buffer has already been allocated and filled from the original values. The pass that reverses the PNG row filters then derives its own extent from the new dimensions and walks the old allocation, moving image bytes past the end of it. The buffer is allocated by GUIX rather than supplied by the caller, so the application has no way to size it defensively. The decoder is compiled in by default.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- GUIX
through 6.5.1.202602a