Warpgate: Web SSH stores a jump host's key against the target's address, so it validates as the target
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.27.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Warpgate is an open source SSH, HTTPS and MySQL bastion host for Linux. From 0.25.0 until 0.27.6, the browser SSH path in warpgate-web-ssh/src/manager.rs handles RCEvent::HostKeyUnknown without the presenting hop identity and instead passes ssh_options.host and ssh_options.port for the final target to KnownHosts::trust. In Prompt and AutoAccept modes, a jump host key can therefore be stored for the target address. A machine later presenting the jump host key at the target address can be accepted as the target, allowing interception of user traffic and a newly issued certificate when certificate authentication is used. The native SSH path is unaffected because it tracks each hop separately. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.6.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- warp-tech warpgate
From 0.25.0 · fixed in 0.27.6