Discourse: Wildcard iframe origin allowlist bypass via authority separators
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.8.0, 2026.7.2, 2026.6.3, 2026.1.8
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to 2026.1.8, 2026.6.3, 2026.7.2, and 2026.8.0, sites using wildcard patterns in the allowed_iframes setting could accept a crafted iframe URL whose allowlisted suffix appeared after a URL authority separator. The wildcard origin check matched the allowed domain text, while browser URL parsing selected a different attacker-controlled origin. A user with posting privileges could exploit the flaw through a post or a Onebox oEmbed response and cause an attacker-controlled iframe to be rendered independently of the allowlisted domain. Successful exploitation requires a site-configured wildcard iframe pattern and the ability to create a post or trigger an oEmbed request for an attacker-controlled URL. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.1.8, 2026.6.3, 2026.7.2, and 2026.8.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- discourse discourse
fixed in 2026.8.0; From 2026.7.0-latest · fixed in 2026.7.2; From 2026.6.0-latest · fixed in 2026.6.3; From 2026.1.0-latest · fixed in 2026.1.8
- discourseBitnami
fixed in 2026.8.0