dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection. The strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as "<name>/<connection_id>", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Timeline

1. Sep 17, 2026, 3:19 PM UTCCVE published
2. Sep 17, 2026, 7:40 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Sep 17, 2026, 7:40 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• ash_authentication

  From 5.0.0-rc.10 · fixed in 5.0.0-rc.14

• team-alembic/ash_authentication

  Version range not reported

References 5