Improper Certificate Verification in Szafir SDK
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.8.463.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
For untrusted certificates that contain the "Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI" extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a "nonqualified" certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nonqualified". For other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nondetermined". This may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation: (1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or (2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application. This issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa Szafir SDK
fixed in 1.8.463.2