dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.12.114, 6.18.52, 7.2.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic. Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by integrity_discard_checksum().
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 · fixed in 388c3f6496bb8083576d989e6d249ba9807c6b0b; From 84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 · fixed in 5c58ea19a909ef6bed4f0f824e9cd7e30d7e4775; From 84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 · fixed in 6228722c27304e4682cddc1fede03898f87e4414; From 84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 · fixed in 68c5c42567bc462139128968ebbfadd0aefff519
- Linux Linux
5.7
- KernelLinux
From 5.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.114; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.52; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.6