Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data, without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it. h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8 byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data. Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is truncated.

Timeline

1. Sep 17, 2026, 4:06 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 19, 2026, 8:57 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  From 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e · fixed in a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393; From 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e · fixed in 22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354; From 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e · fixed in 060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d

• Linux Linux

  6.15

• KernelLinux

  From 6.15.0 · fixed in 6.18.52; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.6

References 3