rust: devres: fix race between concurrent revokers
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.18.56, 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: devres: fix race between concurrent revokers There is a potential race condition when two paths try to revoke a Devres concurrently. The driver core's devres_release_all() calls Revocable::revoke() via the release callback, while Devres::drop() calls revoke_nosync() on another CPU. The revoker that does not claim the is_available swap returns immediately, but the revoker that did may still be executing drop_in_place() on the inner data. This can cause a use-after-free when the other revoker's caller proceeds to drop adjacent resources that drop_in_place() still references (e.g., Devres<DmaMappedSgt> racing with SGTable freeing the backing sg_table and pages). Fix this by adding a Completion. The release callback signals the Completion after revoke() finishes, and Devres::drop() waits for it when it loses the is_available swap. This ensures the wrapped object is fully torn down before Devres::drop() returns.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 05aa6fb1c21d7fb9df735da24096d793223789d5 · fixed in e7930d857cc7930fc39b487ea9f3a453eca3713e; From 05aa6fb1c21d7fb9df735da24096d793223789d5 · fixed in c7e3d57c705ab1053a6a1bbef96795e792da1540; From 05aa6fb1c21d7fb9df735da24096d793223789d5 · fixed in acc516dfa1972d31836b50abc0115216cd0fccc5
- Linux Linux
6.18
- KernelLinux
From 6.18.0 · fixed in 6.18.56; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.4