misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 · fixed in 339f19b9a6171289b0e797deb8bda80b9a1fcc30; From b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 · fixed in 29e634a18957acda11383a15ab98a91c4ae9e294; From b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 · fixed in 2aa0fb9c96f894a9c179a48e7522ea6705800adf; From b9873755a6c8ccfce79094c4dce9efa3ecb1a749 · fixed in 808e530654a5354e6df78863a5d61e4d44e67235
- Linux Linux
6.8
- KernelLinux
From 6.8.0 · fixed in 6.12.109; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.50; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.4