bpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.1.188, 6.6.157, 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels bloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed bitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case. First, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The addition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the fixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX. Subsequent updates can then write past the allocated object. Second, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash is a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit() eventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit kernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit offsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative to the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or write before bloom->bitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap. Keep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an in-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops argument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still selects the intended word in the full bitmap. Compute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final size to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and keeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset. Exploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86 kernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b; From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in 80551bf8912c42d1e3d55eec6fa3c40f306c3de8; From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in 3b7a13eccfcf97714ffc1ca6aa663d66d4a30e29; From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in 272fcb4ba6fab678db0eb966dc81c4c804bef64a; From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in dff481e12b3f127739f6a4ea7cef2c25dc12e056; From 9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa · fixed in 11c1e836710dcba03e50454a4eedfdbaf8d3050e
- Linux Linux
5.16
- KernelLinux
From 5.16.0 · fixed in 6.1.188; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.6.157; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.109; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.50; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.4