Traefik entrypoint header-name sanitization bypassed via request trailers
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.7.13
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.2.0 until 3.7.13, Traefik entrypoint defenses aliasHeadersStrategy, underscoreHeadersStrategy, and forwardedHeaders inspect req.Header but not req.Trailer, allowing an unauthenticated client to submit an aliasing or trusted header name in an HTTP/1.1 chunked trailer or an HTTP/2 trailer. When the retry or buffering middleware reads the body before the reverse proxy clones the request, the attacker-controlled trailer value reaches a backend that merges trailers into the header namespace, bypassing the documented delete or reject behavior and potentially spoofing identity or forwarded routing data. This issue is fixed in 3.7.13.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- traefik traefik
From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.7.13
- github.com/traefik/traefikGo
All versions
- github.com/traefik/traefik/v2Go
All versions
- github.com/traefik/traefik/v3Go
From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.7.13